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REFORM OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
CARL W. SCHNIDER t
INTRODUCTION
There are enough anomalies and inconsistencies in the present
Federal Securities Laws' to justify a significant reform effort. In
November, 1966 approximately eighty lawyers specializing in the
securities field met in Chicago to consider one possible route to reform
-legislative codification.' The keynote speaker was Professor Louis
Loss who proposed the adoption of a federal securities code of approxi-
mately ten titles. There were several other advocates of "codifica-
tion," although they were not in complete agreement as to what such
a program should entail. Codification might involve anything from
a mere rearrangement of existing provisions into a more orderly se-
quence (a project which would not involve "reform"), to a basic
revision of the substantive law.
This article considers another route to reform-administrative
action. The organization of a reform movement will involve establish-
t B.A., Cornell University, 1953. LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1956. Mem-
ber, Pennsylvania Bar. Former Special Adviser to the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Division of Corporate Finance. Chairman, Committee on Securities
Regulation, Philadelphia Bar Association.
I The term "federal securities laws" includes the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's rules and practices, and court and administrative decisions, in addition to the
six statutes administered by the SEC: Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat 74, as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat.
838, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-z (1964); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat.
1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (1964) ; Investment Company Act of 1940,
54 Stat 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1964) ; Investment Advisors Act of 1940,
54 Stat 847, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1964).
2 An edited transcript of the conference appears in Conference on Codification
of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw 793 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 22
Bus. LAw].
3 Louis Loss, History of SEC Legislative Programs and Suggestions for a Code,
id. at 795.
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ment of priorities, allocation of energies to various activities and
direction of efforts along many channels. In organizing for reform,
one major question should be considered: how much of the desired
result can be accomplished without the need for new legislation, capi-
talizing instead on the SEC's administrative authority to achieve sig-
nificant reforms within the existing statutory framework?
It is not the purpose of this article to oppose legislative codifica-
tion. There is no inconsistency in the concurrent pursuit of reform
on both the legislative and administrative levels.' The proponents
of codification acknowledge that a legislative revision will take many
years to achieve.5 Administrative reform can be accomplished much
more quickly and without some of the other drawbacks of a legislative
program, such as the risks that the legislative process will weaken
investor protections; ' that codification of the entire body of law on a
single date will lead to ill-timed consideration of some problem areas; 1
4 See William L. Cary, id. at 911; Philip A. Loomis, Jr., id. at 914; Louis Loss,
id. at 919.
5 E.g., Louis Loss, id. at 798. Codification of the securities laws is a project
which probably will not generate much grass roots public interest. As such, the
project could languish in Congress for a long time, except, in the very unlikely event
of a codification bill which raises no significant controversies. See William L. Cary,
id. at 912; Philip A. Loomis, Jr., id. at 915; Louis A. Loss, id. at 919.
6 See Richard W. Jennings, id. at 879.
7 One inevitable feature of the codification process-aiming at a single piece of
legislation which will work its way through Congress for passage as a unified whole-
is the danger that it will consider some topics prematurely and may frustrate the
normal growth in other areas of law.
Consider the current fluid state of the law and the likely effect of a codification
program if it were at an advanced stage today. The impact of the 1964 Amendments,
Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, is just beginning to be felt,
especially in the banking and insurance industries. Other recommendations of the
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Special Study of the Securities Markets, H.R. Doc.
No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as SEC Special Study of
Markets] are yet to receive a definitive implementation or rejection. The Commis-
sion's Mutual Fund Study, Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Public Policy Implications
of Investment Company Growth, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Mutual Fund Report], climaxing eight years of effort, has
just been made public, and the SEC has introduced highly controversial legislation
to implement its proposals. S. 1659, H.R. 9511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Certain
principles are just beginning to emerge beyond the boiler room context. One example
is the doctrine of "suitability," a broker-dealer's obligation to tailor investment recom-
mendations to the financial needs of a particular customer. See First Securities
Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589 (1961); Gerald L. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 137-38 (1960);
Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Siitability Doctrine,
1965 Duax L.J. 445. Another emerging principle is the obligation of a broker-dealer
to have a reasonable basis for a recommendation. See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137
(2d Cir. 1963), affirming Mac Robbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. 116 (1962); Ross Securities,
Inc., 41 S.E.C. 509 (1963); Barnett & Co., 40 S.E.C. 521 (1961); Leonard Button
Corp., 39 S.E.C. 211 (1959); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2,
1962) ; Schneider, SEC Filings-Their Use to the Professional, 21 FiNrArcrAL Ai,-
ALYSTS J. 33 (1965); Note, New and Comprehensive Duties of Securities Seller to
Investigate, Disclose, and Have an "Adequate Basis" for Representations, 62 MIcHr.
L. REy. 880 (1964). The standards of voluntary disclosures (e.g., through press
releases, annual and other reports to the public, as opposed to required filings with
the SEC) are undergoing change, and the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation, SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), will certainly have a
lasting impact in this area. The relationships among the various capital markets are
REFORM OF SECURITIES LAWS
and that codification will create as many problems and uncertainties as
it will solve.' Whether or not legislative codification is undertaken,
some of the available energies ought to be devoted to administrative
reform efforts. The bar and various segments of the securities industry
should unite with the SEC to find the most creative solutions which can
be fashioned within the Commission's present authority.
Much of the Chicago discussion focused on Milton H. Cohen's
germinal article,9 which in turn was based on the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Special Study recommendations concerning
the integration of the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act and
the 1934 Act.Y Mr. Cohen suggested de-emphasis of the 1933
Act's focus-disclosure through registration. Instead, 1934 Act con-
tinuous reporting would become the basic feature of the disclosure
system. The principal focus of this article is also on the "disclosure
system"-that part of the federal securities laws which applies to
publicly owned companies and their insiders under the 1933 Act and
shifting as a result of the relatively recent growth in importance of the third market,
as well as the recent amendment of Rule 394 of the New York Stock Exchange,
NYSE GUIDE f2394 (CCH 1967), permitting Exchange members to deal in listed
securities, under certain limited circumstances, off the exchange. Various trading
practices have been the subject of reforms in the relatively recent past, such as
the restriction on "floor trading" by exchange members, SEC Rule Ila-1, 17 C.F.R.
240.1la-1 (Supp. 1966), and NYSE Rules 108-13, NYSE GutroE 2108-13 (CCH
1967), discussed in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 7330 (Aug. 3, 1964) ;
7290 (April 9, 1964), and the publication of "inside" quotations for over-the-counter
stocks.
Certain other practices vitally affecting securities markets are under close scrutiny
by the SEC, including the stock exchanges' minimum commission system with no
volume discount, SEC Mutual Fund Report 156-57, the odd lot differential and
"give-ups," id. at 169-88. Financial reporting of "conglomerate" companies is another
problem which has grown to significant proportions in the past several years and
which the Commission has under active study. The extent to which the issuers and
insiders can purchase their stock in the market has also been explored recently.
SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 66 Civ. No. 1215, S.D.N.Y. 1966, consent decree
reported in CCH Fmn. SEc. L. REP. ff 96,690 (May 24, 1966); Cohen, A Note on
Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149, 154-56 (1966) ;
Baker, Purchases by a Corporation of Its Ozm Shares for Employee Benefit Plans,
22 Bus. LAw. 439 (1967). The Supreme Court has yet to pass directly on the doctrine
of implied civil liability under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964), and the lower
courts are still laboring to fix the limits of the doctrine.
With all of these developments going on at once, an effort to codify all of the
securities laws at the present time would be inappropriate. In many areas referred
to above, there is not enough accumulated experience to make meaningful decisions.
In at least some areas, the Commission, as it frankly acknowledges, is experimenting.
In other areas, doctrines could grow best by a common-law, case-by-case approach.
Even if the status of the law as of the codification date could be codified, future growth
and development might be frustrated. See Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling
Practice Standards, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 691, 714-19 (1964).
While it is true that no one expects codification to take place this year or even next
year, there is the danger that whenever the bill is enacted, there will be some areas
of the law where legislative action is premature or otherwise inadvisable. As a
corollary, if overall codification is delayed to await the solution of problems, there
will be other areas where reform is unduly postponed.
8 See generally William L. Cary, 22 Bus. LAW. 911; F. Arnold Daum, id. at 819;
Louis Loss, id. at 919.
9 Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 IIAv. L. REv. 1340 (1966).
10 SEC Special Study of Markets pt. 1 at 591-95.
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the 1934 Act." This is in contrast to those aspects of the law which
directly regulate various branches of the securities industry.
Preliminarily this article will identify some of the problems of
the disclosure system which a reform effort should attempt to solve.
In an ideal disclosure system, investors would have readily available
in useful form the maximum amount of information which could be
produced without undue burden on the issuer. It would be appropriate
to have the issuer's burden of compliance correspond with the public's
need for information in any given situation. In contrast with routine
periodic reporting, more disclosure should be required if, for example,
a major underwriting by the company exposes investors to con-
centrated sales efforts, a significant event occurs (e.g., an important
acquisition of another business) or if stockholder action is requested
(e.g., voting at a meeting). In addition, the delay involved in com-
plying with applicable requirements should be kept to a minimum;
there should be certainty as to when various requirements apply, how
compliance can be achieved and the consequences of non-compliance.
The present disclosure system is far from ideal in many respects.
In terms of time, effort and expense, 1933 Act registration is probably
the most burdensome of all the disclosure filing requirements.'2 Under
present law, the burden of 1933 Act registration falls in a somewhat
arbitrary manner. Too often the obligation to register depends on
how long the securities in question have been held by the seller, or
on the form rather than the substance of a transaction. 3 It would
be more appropriate to consider factors such as the probable effect of
the sale on the public market (in terms of how the sale is made and
the amount of securities being sold), or the amount of information
about the issuer already available to the investor.
The present disclosure system is also inefficient. Much of the
information now being made available is neither readily accessible nor
in a useful form for the investor. For example, in many cases it
would be difficult to construct a current and accurate picture of a com-
11 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12-14, 48 Stat. 892, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771-78n
(1964) ; § 16, 48 Stat. 896, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964). The principal 1934
Act liability provisions constituting parts of the "disclosure system" are Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964) ; § 18,
48 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78r (1964); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1964).
12 See Wheat & Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus.
LAW. 539 (1960).
13 As practical examples, an investment purchaser who purchased in an exempt
"private" offering under the Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 48 Stat. 77, as amended,
15 U.S.C. 77d (1964), may sell the shares without registration if he holds them long
enough; and SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1964), provides an exemption from
registration in an acquisition taking the form of a merger or a stock-for-assets deal,
but not if the same transaction is in a stock-for-stock format.
REFORM OF SECURITIES LAWS
pany's business and property from its SEC filings. In addition, com-
pliance with the disclosure requirements involves considerable delay.
Months may elapse from the time of a decision to sell securities until
a 1933 Act registration statement can become effective-a factor
which can be an insurmountable hurdle in attempting to negotiate a
transaction. This problem is heightened by the considerable uncer-
tainty which faces an issuer, both as to the circumstances which give
rise to disclosure requirements and the information which must be
disclosed.
The specific proposals for reform which follow are not intended
as a definitive program. Rather, they are intended to be suggestive
or illustrative of a basic approach-that significant reform can be
accomplished by prompt administrative action. Such an administra-
tive reform program should be undertaken whether or not there is
a concurrent codification effort.
An administrative reform effort should exploit the great ability
which the SEC has shown for adapting the statutory system to meet
specific needs. To illustrate this ingenuity, consider the timing aspects
of the 1933 Act registration process. The act appears to contemplate
the filing of a registration statement which automatically becomes
effective twenty days after the date of filing or the date of the last
pre-effective amendment. If the registration statement is deficient,
the Commission is empowered to issue a stop order.14 The system
might have been completely unworkable, except for the Commission's
creation of three techniques-the acceleration request, the comment
letter and the delaying amendment. 5 The same ingenuity should be
14 Securities Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. 79, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1964).
15 See Securities Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat 79, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1964).
The potential deficiencies in the statute were twofold. First, a twenty-day delay as
envisioned by the statute was totally unrealistic. Underwriters were unwilling to fix
the price for an offering twenty days before sales could commence. To solve this
problem, the Commission developed the acceleration technique which permitted the
registration statement to become effective on very short notice. Subsequently, the
technique was given express recognition in the 1940 amendments to § 8(a),, 54 Stat
857 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1964) ; cf. SEC Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1964).
The second difficulty with the statutory scheme was the fact that the stop order
seemed to be an unnecessarily severe remedy for a deficient registration statement
Would not the public interest be better served by correcting the deficient filing rather
than issuing a stop order? To serve this purpose, the staff "comment letter" or
"deficiency letter" has been adopted as an integral part of the administrative process.
To preclude the registration statement from becoming effective prematurely, before
the staff completed its review or before the issuer finalized the disclosure documents,
the "delaying amendment" was invented. See SEC Rule 473, 17 C.F.R. § 230.473
(1964).
The foregoing comment does not imply unqualified approval of the Commission's
comment letter practices. The argument might even be made that Congress never
intended the Commission to review filings at all. All this is beside the point, how-
ever. Given the Commission's view of its statutory role, the statutory provisions
for automatic effectiveness in twenty days, subject only to the Commission's stop
order powers, might have presented insuperable practical difficulties had it not been
for the Commission's ingenuity in contriving the delaying amendment, the comment
letter and its acceleration practice.
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utilized to simplify, rationalize and generally reform the disclosure
system.
REFORM TOOLS OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission has various sources of authority which enable
it to accomplish substantial administrative reforms within the existing
statutory framework. Even now the statutes constitute the barest
skeleton of the law. The flesh and blood of the disclosure system is
very largely an administrative rather than a legislative creation. Gen-
erally, this appears to be what Congress intended. The 1933 and
1934 Acts expressly delegate to the Commission the authority to
promulgate operative requirements within the overall statutory plan.
This delegation of authority is particularly broad,' 6 and a number of
commentators have noted the administrative power of the SEC to
accomplish substantial reformsY
The Commission has several tools at its disposal which permit
substantial remolding of the substantive law within this broad statutory
authority. The first of these is its power to promulgate the various
disclosure forms, and determine, to a great extent, when they must
be used. Of necessity, Congress has vested this power completely in
the Commission.' It would be entirely unrealistic for Congress to
specify the precise form and content of the registration statements,
proxy statements and periodic reports which must be filed by different
classes of issuers under varying circumstances. The power to deter-
mine the form, content and timing 9 of disclosure filings enables the
Commission to shape and, if necessary, to reshape the actual dis-
closure system as it applies to various categories of issuers. Proposals
for integrating the 1933 and 1934 Acts, such as those made by
Milton Cohen and the Special Study,"° must be implemented, at
least in part, through the administrative promulgation of disclo-
sure forms. Indeed, a good number of Milton Cohen's many
'8 Hon. Henry J. Friendly, 22 Bus. LAW. 901.
17Kenneth J. Bialkin, id. at 888; William L. Cary, id. at 911; F. Arnold Daum,
id. at 821; Harry Heller, id. at 823, 826-27; Philip A. Loomis, Jr., id. at 914-15;
James C. Sargent, id. at 802.
Is E.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 48 Stat. 81, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j
(1964); §19(a), 48 Stat. 85, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (1964); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b) (1), 48 Stat. 892, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1)
(1964) ; § 13(b), 48 Stat. 894, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1964); §§ 14(a), (c), 48 Stat.
895, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (c) (1964).
19 For practical purposes the timing of reports under the 1934 Act is left entirely
to the discretion of the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 48 Stat. 894, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964).
20 See notes 9-10 supra.
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constructive suggestions are "mechanistic!" and of a type which
Congress, as a practical matter, would find impossible to implement.2
The second Commission tool is its rule-making power, which in-
cludes the power to define terms.' The Commission has shown a high
degree of ingenuity in solving practical problems by creative use
of this power within the existing statutes. Consider the impact on
the law of some of the landmark definitional rules: 1933 Act Rule
133,24 in defining such terms as "offer" and "sale," recasts the 1933
Act registration provisions insofar as they apply to mergers and
certain types of similar transactions; 1933 Act Rule 15425 defines
"brokers' transactions" to create a de minimis exemption provision
permitting minor sales through brokers by controlling persons; of
course, 1934 Act Rule 10b-5 presents a classic example of the vast
impact rule-making might have. 6
The power to classify 27 also can be a powerful tool for reform.
The Commission has used this power to a limited extent in establishing
classifications based on the type of offering,2" the business of the
issuer,' the type of security,30 the amount of information available,"1
and the investment grade of the security.3 Reform proposals have sug-
gested registering companies rather than particular securities. 3 This
approach entails special disclosure requirements for a "first" public
offering or when companies "first" achieve broad public ownership. At
present, provisions of the 1964 Amendments bring companies into the
2 1 The word is his. Cohen, supra note 9, at 1376.
22 E.g., Mr. Cohen's proposals for a uniform numbering system for similar dis-
closure "items" in various forms, id. at 1375, or an indexing system, id. at 1381, or
his proposals on accessibility of information, id. at 1376.
2 3 E.g., Securities Act of 1933, §19(a), 48 Stat. 85, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77s (a) (1964) ; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a), 48 Stat 901, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).
24 SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1964).
25 SEC Rule 154, 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1964).
26 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964). It has been reliably reported,
however, that the authors of Rule lob-5 never contemplated the doctrine of implied
civil liability for fraud spawned by the rule. Milton Freeman, 22 Bus. LAw. 921-22.
27 Securities Act of 1933 §3(b), 48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77c(b)
(1964); § 10(d), 48 Stat. 81, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (d) (1964); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(h), added by 78 Stat 565 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 781(h);
§ 13(c), 48 Stat 894, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(c) (1964); §23(a), 48 Stat. 901, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).
2 8 E.g., SEC Forms S-8, 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b (Supp. 1966), discussed in note 37
infra and accompanying text; S-14, 17 C.F.R. § 239.23 (1964).
2 9 E.g., SEC Forms S-5, 17 C.F.R. §239.15 (1964); S-11, 17 C.F.R. §239.18
(Supp. 1966) ; N-5, 17 C.F.R. § 239.24 (Supp. 1966) ; S-2, 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1964)
(for promotional companies).30 E.g., SEC Forms S-19, 17 C.F.R. § 239.22 (1964); S-12, 17 C.F.R. § 239.19
(1964) ; F-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.9 (1964).3 1 E.g., SEC Forms S-8, 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b (Supp. 1966); S-9, 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.22 (1964) ; S-14, 17 C.F.R. § 23923 (1964) ; "summary prospectuses" permitted
by Rule 434A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.434A (1964); SEC Forms 8-A to 8-C, 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.208a-208c (Supp. 1966).
32 SEC Form S-9, 17 C.F.R. § 239.22 (1964); cf. proposed SEC Form S-7,
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4849 (Nov. 16, 1966).
33 See, e.g., Cohen, mipra note 9, at 1405; Louis Loss, 22 Bus. LAw 796.
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continuous reporting system when they first achieve broad public owner-
ship. 4 The Commission's power to classify already enables it to tailor
special disclosure provisions for companies upon their "first" achieving
public ownership, thus accomplishing, at least in part, the basic objective
(if not the form) of a system for the permanent registration of public
companies instead of registering particular securities.3 5
Still another source of Commission power for reform lies in its
authority to grant conditional privileges, exemptions and benefits.30
An issuer may be given the privilege of using a limited disclosure
form if it undertakes to make additional disclosure under prescribed
circumstances. For example, an issuer must make two undertakings
to supply additional information in the future as a condition to the
use of Form S-8, an abbreviated 1933 Act registration form used to
offer securities to employees under various types of plans." Use of the
shelf registration procedure is normally available only to those insurers
who also agree to undertake additional disclosures at a later date.38
Regulation A under the 1933 Act is another example of an exemption
from registration, in this case for offerings of less than $300,000, condi-
tioned upon issuers making various disclosures. 9 Finally, the con-
ditional privilege has been used by the SEC in connection with the
acceleration of registration statements under the 1933 Act; '0 such use
might be expanded. 4
34 The current test is that total assets must exceed $1,000,000 and there must be
a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more persons. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 12(g) (1), added by 78 Stat. 565, 15 U.S.C. § 781(q) (1) (1964).
35 See Louis Loss, 22 Bus. LAw 796; Cohen, supra note 9 passin.
36The SEC is granted express power under both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act
to create either absolute or conditional exemptions. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b),
48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(a) (12), 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (12) (1964).
3 7 Employees covered by the plan must receive copies of the issuer's proxy state-
ment and reports to its stockholders and if the employees resell their stock to the
general public under certain circumstances, the prospectus must be supplemented.
SEC Form S-8, undertakings B, C, 17 C.F.R. §239.16b (1964).
38 "Shelf registration" relates to registration of securities for which there is no
immediate plan of distribution.
39 SEC Rules 251-63, 17 C.F.Rt §§ 230.251-.263 (1964). In fact, the disclosures
required are so extensive that the conditional exemption amounts to a short form of
registration, without the need for a full set of exhibits or certified financial statements.
In one respect, the Regulation A exemption process is more onerous than full registra-
tion. The off eror under Regulation A must file progress reports on the results of the
offering and on the application of the proceeds, a requirement having no counterpart
for a fully-registered offering. SEC Rule 260, 17 C.F.R. § 230.260 (1964).
40 See the Commission's official note following SEC Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460
(1964). As to acceleration, see note 15 supra.
41 Of course, one treads on thin ice in treating acceleration as a "privilege" which
may be conditioned. For the debate precipitated by the American Bar Association's
unsuccessful attempt to curtail the Commission's discretion regarding acceleration,
see Gadsby & Garrett, "Acceleration" Under the Securities Act of 1933-A Comment
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Disclosure itself can be used as a technique of substantive reform.
By framing disclosure requirements, the Commission can strongly
influence, even if it does not necessarily mandate, corporate practice.4
An example of the Commission's impact in this area is its requirement
that the prospectus disclose whether the issuer will distribute certified
financial statements to its stockholders.43 The issuer is free to answer
in the negative. However, the question forces the issuer to declare
its intention, and has probably committed some issuers, who otherwise
would not have done so, to a distribution of certified statements.
Industry self-regulation-an integral part of the federal securities
law-is another potential source of reform. Many types of reform
can be accomplished by appropriate action of the stock exchanges and
the NASD. These institutions can and do exercise considerable in-
fluence over the disclosure system and the affairs of public companies.
The stock exchanges generally enter into contracts which obligate
companies with listed securities to follow certain practices. For ex-
ample, annual reports with audited financial statements must be dis-
tributed by these companies to stockholders promptly after the end
of the fiscal year, and unaudited income statements must be published
quarterly.' While the NASD does not enter into contracts with
over-the-counter companies, it does establish standards which must
be met before quotations may be published in newspapers.4 5  Creative
use of this form of industry self-regulation should be employed as
part of any reform effort.
Assume, for example, that there was general support for the
SEC's suggestion that insiders should not trade in stocks of their own
companies for twenty-four hours after an important press release.40
Such a standard could be implemented widely by a stock exchange
on the A.B.A/s Legislative Proposal, 13 Bus. LAw. 718 (1958); Mulford, "Accele-
ration " Under the Securities Act of 1933-A Reply to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 14 Bus. LAw. 156 (1958). Practitioners, the writer included, experience
resentment on those relatively rare occasions when the (implied) threat of withholding
acceleration is used as a club to force compliance with the staff's view. However,
the evil lies in the possibility of arbitrary and, for all practical purposes, unreviewable
use of power under undefined circumstances. Cf. Crooker v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944
(1st Cir. 1947). On the other hand, is there an inherent objection in principle (though
one may disagree as to any given decision) to the Commissioner's promulgation,
after consultation with the industry, of clearly articulated standards, defining generally
applicable circumstances pertinent to its statutory responsibilities under which it will
withhold acceleration? Presumably, no such standards would be adopted by the
Commission unless there is a reasonable consensus of outside supporting opinion.
42See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 H.av. L. RPv.
1146, 1149 (1965).
43SEC Securities Act Release No. 4666, 1 15 (Feb. 7, 1964).
44NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL A-20 to -22, A-69, A-70
(1967); Listing Form L, ArmmcAx STOCK EXCHANGE GuIDE 8955 (CCH 1966).
45 NASD MANUALf 12155, at 2072 (CCH 1967).
46 Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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requirement that companies, as a condition to listing, adopt a suitable
by-law or other company policy on this topic. There are probably
some duties which stock exchanges would find appropriate to impose
but which the SEC, as a government agency with a limited mandate
to control corporate affairs, might itself hesitate to establish as a
condition to a privilege-for example, a requirement that certain
transactions be submitted to stockholder vote even though no vote
is required under state law.
47
Another technique of reform through industry self-regulation is
the integration of SEC requirements with stock exchange rules or
standards. The SEC can use its rule-making power to confer benefits,
such as reduced prospectus delivery requirements or reduced disclosure
requirements, on companies which meet certain exchange-imposed
standards." This is a variation of the "conditional privilege" ap-
proach. There is also a potential for integration of the disclosure
documents themselves to serve dual purposes. Basic disclosure docu-
ments should be designed to meet the requirements of both the ex-
changes and the SEC. This can be accomplished through incorpora-
tion by reference 49 or by permitting the use of the same document with
different cover pages-techniques already used to some extent. 0
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM OF THE DIsCLOSURE SYSTEM
This section of the article will consider the application of the
Commission's administrative tools to reform various aspects of the
disclosure system. The following discussion, illustrating the applica-
tion of SEC power to reform the law, assumes that the federal
securities laws will remain essentially disclosure-orientated, 5' with-
out attempting direct regulation of the merits of securities which
47 This practice is in use at the present time. The New York and American
Stock Exchanges will not grant an application for listing shares issuable on the
exercise of options granted to officers, directors or key employees, nor will they
grant an application for listing of shares issuable in a major acquisition, unless the
option plan or acquisition has been approved by a vote of stockholders solicited under
the SEC's proxy rules, even though no such vote is required by state law.
4
8 Cf. SEC Rule 174(b), 17 C.F.R. 230.174(b) (Supp. 1966).
49 See the 1934 Act registration statement on Form 10 of American Cement
Corp., SEC File No. 1-4716, where several lengthy items of the form were answered
by incorporating by reference a designated section in a New York Stock Exchange
Listing Application which was attached as an exhibit to the Form 10 filing.
50 Stock exchange listing applications frequently consist of a cover page wrapped
around an SEC filing such as a prospectus or proxy statement, but the opposite
procedure is rare.
51 Possibly a thorough-going legislative reform program would re-examine and
re-evaluate every premise underlying the law, but such an undertaking is beyond
the scope of this article. Professor Louis Loss also seems to feel that it is unnecessary
to "refight the battle of philosophies." 22 Bus. LAw. 808. But see MANNE, INsIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MAzxaur (1966) (who suggests a complete reappraisal of
the traditional principles in the area of insider trading); Stigler, Public Regulation
of the Securities Markets, 19 Bus. LAw. 721 (1964).
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may be sold to the public, an approach taken by several state blue-sky
laws.52
A preliminary caveat applies to a number of the following pro-
posals. The techniques suggested are subject to abuse. They can
be used to accomplish objectives both within and beyond the purview
of the federal securities laws. It is assumed that the Commission
would not use these techniques in a manner not supported by the
consensus of outside opinion. Past experience justifies proceeding
on such a premise, at least preliminarily. 3 The Commission generally
has not changed its rules, promulgated forms or taken similar formal
action without significant public support. When functioning at this
level, the Commission has exercised restraint. Formal SEC proposals
meeting widespread opposition and little outside endorsement are
generally modified or abandoned.
Some of the suggestions made below call for new types of dis-
closure requirements. The overall objective of a reform program,
however, should not be to impose more burdens on public companies,
but to impose different burdens. Hopefully, the public interest can
be better served through a system imposing fewer overall burdens
on public companies if the disclosure requirements can be restructured
on a more rational basis.
A. The Disclosure Documents
There is general agreement that under certain circumstances 1933
Act registration in its present form involves expense, delay and in-
convenience entirely disproportionate to the public benefit achieved.
For example, assume the following typical case: a giant public com-
pany, G Company, with stock listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change, acquires a small family company, F Company, through an
exchange of a relatively small amount of G stock for all of the out-
standing F stock. Members of the F family have no further con-
nection with the business other than as small stockholders of the G
stock. A year after the transaction they want to sell their newly
acquired G stock from time to time over the New York Stock Ex-
change. Other public documents, including SEC filings, annual re-
ports to shareholders and investment manuals, make readily available
in convenient form essentially all of the information relating to G
62 See, e.g., CAj Coni. CoD. § 25507.
W3 Cf. Cohen, sumpra note 9, at 1390 n.145. For a former SEC Chairman's view
as to the responsiveness of the SEC and other regulatory agencies to political pressure,
see CARY, POT=ICS AN I THE REGULATORY AGoaciEs chs. 1, 2 (1967). " • . . I
believe it is safe to conclude that agencies seldom take controversial steps under their
rule-making power which do not have some support from Congress." Id. at 53.
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Company which would be contained in a prospectus. Nonetheless,
full registration on Form S-1 is required for this transaction under
present law, even though it is unlikely that any purchaser of the
F family's G stock will ever see a copy of the prospectus.54 It may
be that the entire distribution of F family's stock is accomplished in
one or a very few transactions. In such a case, 1933 Act registration
is a wasteful exercise, although it does serve a limited purpose by advis-
ing the financial community of the existence of the transaction.
The public interest would be served better, balancing burden
against benefit, if 1933 Act registration relating to this transaction
could be accomplished by a registration form which merely identified
the transactions and the securities issued in connection therewith.
55
The form might also include a brief description of F Company, in-
cluding its financial statements, if the acquisition meets a minimal
test of materiality to G Company as the acquiring company. Such
an abbreviated registration would continue to achieve the beneficial
purpose of informing the financial community about the transaction.
In most cases, this information could be disseminated through the
medium of the investment manual or services.
In effect, it is suggested that for the transaction hypothesized
above, the 1933 Act registration form be reduced to a simple docu-
ment resembling a 1934 Act Form 8-K report on the transaction or,
possibly, a stock exchange additional listing application relating to the
stock issued in the transaction. Indeed, the registration statement
might well take a "wrap-around" form: a cover sheet physically
attached to a stock exchange listing application.
The prospectus for such an offering (assuming that one would
be required) could be reduced to a short paragraph which merely
identifies the securities as part of a bloc of stock issued in the transac-
tion referred to in the registration statement. The entire prospectus
might read as follows:
These shares were issued by G Company on January 1,
1967, to the sellers of these shares as part of a bloc of 50,000
shares issued by G Company in connection with its acquisition
of F Company. A registration describing this transaction
has been filed by G Company with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the New York Stock Exchange.
A See SEC Rule 153, 17 C.F.R. § 230.153 (1964).
55 The SEC has the power to promulgate Registration Forms which do not cover
all the items in Schedule A of the 1933 Act. Compare Securities Act of 1933 § 7,
48 Stat. 78, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964), with § 19(a), 48 Stat. 85, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77s(a) (1964). Doubts about this power should be put to rest by years of practice
with abbreviated forms, e.g., SEC Form S-8, 17 C.F.R. 239.16b (1964).
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If use of this short, short form were conditioned on an undertaking
to supply certain additional information, the issuer might be required
to include in the prospectus an undertaking such as:
G Company will supply upon written request copies of
the following documents in accordance with the rules of the
Securities and Exchange Commission: r6 its registration
statement relating to these shares, its most recent annual re-
port to shareholders, its most recent proxy statement relating
to the election of directors and its most recent annual
report of Form 10-K to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.
Such a short form prospectus could be distributed in compliance
with the law by typing it or rubber stamping it on the confirmation
covering the registered shares. It could be affixed to the confirmation
in the form of a gummed label. Although such a registration state-
ment and prospectus accomplish little, little burden is involved. While
a long run legislative codification program may eliminate the need for
even this vestigial type of prospectus, the suggested short, short form
represents, at least, a relatively painless temporary expedient which
can save much time, effort and money pending a legislative reform.
The short, short form suggested above is comparable to the rather
ingenious requirement of the Comptroller of the Currency, who ad-
ministers the 1934 Act disclosure system with respect to national
banks. 57  Notwithstanding the statutory requirement that an issuer
shall "register . . . by filing . . . a registration statement," 58 the
Comptroller's regulation provides that compliance with a requirement
to file copies of the bank's annual report to stockholders with the
Comptroller, "shall be deemed a registration" under the 1934 Act. 9
The foregoing proposal for a short form of registration state-
ment and prospectus relates to the stock issued in an acquisition trans-
action,' and merely illustrates the technique of tailoring the registration
56 Of course there would have to be many refinements. Should the undertaking
be only for the benefit of buyers of the shares or should it cover any broker-dealer?
Should there be a limit on the number of copies to be supplied? Use of such short
forms probably should be conditioned on the issuer's supplying the specified documents
to any recognized financial manual or service which covers its securities.
57 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(i), added by 78 Stat. 565 (1964), 15
U.S.C. § 781(i) (1964).
68 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), added by 78 Stat 565 (1964), 15
U.S.C. § 781(g) (1964).
6931 Fed. Reg. 6949 (1966), amending 12 C.F.R. § 10.1(b) (1964).
'OAcquisition transactions present an especially fruitful area for special registra-
tion procedures and forms. At the present time there are almost as many acquisitions
involving the issuance of stock as there are public offerings registered under the
Securities Act of 1933.
There will be an estimated 1,300 or more acquisitions involving the issuance of
stock during 1967, up from about 925 in 1966, according to figures published by The
Wall Street Journal, Thursday, July 6, 1967, page 12, cols. 3 and 4. During the 5
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form to the needs of the particular distribution. The Commission has
already made limited use of this approach in evolving special 1933
Act registration forms for offerings made to employees and offerings
of securities issued in certain transactions covered by a proxy state-
ment."' The technique can and should be exploited further. Forms
might take into account such variables as the type of distribution (e.g.,
conventional underwriting, rights offering, exchange offerings for
securities of the same issuer or another issuer, directly negotiated
sales which are not otherwise exempt, "from time to time" sales
handled as customary brokerage transactions), relative size of the
offering, type of information already available about the issuer, and
the type and investment grade of the security. 2  Special forms
for pledge transactions present an especially fruitful field for reform. 
s
years ended June 30, 1966, the average number of 1933 Act registrations becoming
effective per year was 1,382, the high being 1,844 in 1962-63 and the low being 1,121
in 1963-64. The average number for the 10 years ended June 30, 1966 was 1,265.
1966 SEC ANx. REP. 155. Each such acquisition involves a potential 1933 Act
registration problem.
1 SEC Forms S-8, 17 C.F.R. §239.16b (1964); S-14, 17 C.F.R. §239.23 (1964).
The latter is in the form of a "wrap-around" cover sheet over a proxy statement.
6 See, e.g., SEC Form S-9, 17 C.F.R. § 239.22 (1964), which is limited to non-
convertible debt securities. While the Commission does not pass directly on the merits
of securities, it can and in fact does limit the use of certain registration forms to com-
panies which meet certain objective criteria which tend to assure that the securities wili
have a high investment quality. See, e.g., SEC Form S-9, general instruction A, 17
C.F.R. § 239.22 (1964) ; Proposed SEC Form S-7, general instruction A, SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 4849 (Nov. 16, 1966). There is also a special SEC Form S-2,
17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1964), to be used for promotional companies. See also SEC
Form S-1, instruction A(1) (a), 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1964), as to financial statements.
3A pledge, as such, by an "investment" holder or controlling person may be
an exempt transaction. However, the sale of the pledged securities by the pledgee
following foreclosure may require registration under the 1933 Act. SEC v. Guild
Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1960). Accordingly,
a pledgee may be unwilling to accept unregistered securities as collateral which
could not be resold freely by the pledgor. (As to the pledgee's right to sell in the
shoes of the pledgor under Rule 154, see SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan.
21, 1966).) Many bona fide business transactions are complicated or completely
frustrated because of the inability of controlling persons or "investment" holders to
pledge their securities. In addition, countless hours and dollars have been expended
in filing registration statements (or in preparing elaborate agreements to file registra-
tion statements) solely to cover the unlikely contingency that the pledgee will desire
to sell securities on foreclosure.
It is suggested that an abbreviated form of registration, or a conditional ex-
emption from registration, be promulgated to permit public sales by pledgees on
foreclosure with a minimum of delay and expense. Recognizing that most pledges
are redeemed, reasonable procedures should facilitate proper transactions, even if the
accommodation creates a minor enforcement problem. An airtight system from the
enforcement viewpoint would be unduly stifling to legitimate business.
The procedure should be applicable only to bona fide pledges as defined. Criteria
might include requirements that the pledged securities are of similar investment
quality to those generally accepted by the pledgee as collateral; that the collateral
value attributed to the securities does not exceed the lesser of the value generally
advanced by the pledgee or, say, two-thirds of the fair market value; and that the
pledge be on the pledgee's prevailing terms, including interest rates. Possibly the
abbreviated procedure should be limited to banking institutions. Being subject to
other regulatory procedures, there is less chance that banks, as contrasted with other
types of pledgees, would be used to facilitate subterfuge transactions. The abbre-
viated procedure might be limited to pledges covering a maximum of five per cent
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As an example of this approach, I would suggest that, within prescribed
limits, prospectuses for preemptive rights offerings not require dis-
closure on management for issuers who solicit proxies under the
proxy rules, provided that the issuer undertakes on request to supply
a copy of its latest annual meeting proxy statement. 4
B. When Disclosure Documents Must Be Used
A major focus of a reform program should be on questions of
timing-when must the disclosure documents be used. The most
important question is: when is 1933 Act registration required? Many
of the problem areas revolve around the statutory definition of "under-
writer" 65 and the related "private offering" exemption."6
One of the most perplexing problems for the practitioner is the
difficulty of explaining to his client the mystique of "investment intent."
Investment intent is not a statutory criterion at all. The term has
evolved to express the state of mind of a person who, in the Com-
mission's view, purchases securities without "a view . . . to dis-
tribution." 17 An investment purchaser may sell securities without
of the class of securities or five times the average weekly trading value within the
past four weeks, whichever is less; the pledgee might be limited to sales through
routine brokerage transactions. Cf. SEC Rule 154, 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1964). The
procedure might be limited to cases where the issuer meets tests to insure its reasonable
stability (e.g., net income in each of the past five years, no recent changes in the
control or business activity, etc.).
In cases where the pledgee intends to sell under the abbreviated procedure, the
registration statement or documentation underlying a conditional exemption, might
include a simple notice form describing the surrounding circumstances. The notice
would be required to include a statement that neither the pledgee nor the pledgor
knows of "any material adverse information . . . with regard to the current and
prospective operations of the registrant not disclosed . . ." to the public either through
SEC filings or in some other appropriate manner (such as a press release or report
to shareholders). The quoted phrase is from the form of representation which the
Commission now requests of selling shareholders in a registered secondary distribu-
tion. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4666, 27 (Feb. 7, 1964).
04 The proxy statement contains essentially the same information as a 1933 Act
prospectus. Compare 1933 Act Form S-1, items 16-20, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11, at 49-52
(Supp. 1966), with the 1934 Act proxy rules, Regulation 14A, Schedule 14A, items
5-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1964). See text accompanying note 99 infra. Presumably
all stockholders receiving subscription rights, except new ones, will already have seen
the proxy statement. Possibly a copy of the prior proxy statement should be required
to accompany the prospectus, to the extent that unsubscribed shares are reoffered to
non-stockholders. This approach of having a "prospectus" contained in two docu-
ments is not without precedent. See SEC Rule 431, 17 C.F.R. § 230.431 (1964).
If this special rights offering abbreviated form is adopted, exceptions might make
it unavailable if there has been a major change in management within the relatively
recent past (and a fortiori if there has been a major change since the last annual
meeting proxy statement), or if the offering fails to meet other tests to insure that
it is non-speculative.
65 Securities Act of 1933 §2(11), 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77b(11)
(1964).
66 Securities Act of 1933 §4(2), 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2)
(1964).
67 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11)
(1964). The SEC itself has made official use of "investment" terminology. E.g.,
SEC Form 8-K, item 7, instruction 3.
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registration if there has been an intervening change in his personal
circumstances. In fact, there have been registration statements filed
for shareholders under circumstances where the nonpublic offering
exemption would apply, except that the shareholder refuses to make
the necessary investment commitment. While the purchaser has no
specific intention to sell the shares, he insists upon registration in
order to reserve the flexibility of having shares which may be sold or
pledged freely. Years may pass without a single share being sold.
Since the filing of the registration statement at the time the shares
were acquired in effect negates investment intent, theoretically a cur-
rent prospectus would be required whenever the shareholder desires
to sell, no matter how deferred the date of sale.6" Any determination
of the need for registration which turns on changes in the personal
circumstances of the investor gives critical significance to a factor
which is irrelevant from the point of view of the public securities
markets. Would not the statutory purpose be better served by focus-
ing on factors such as: the amount of securities to be sold (measured
absolutely and relatively as a proportion of the floating supply and of
the entire class); the manner in which the securities are to be sold
(e.g., a conventional underwriting with heavy selling incentives versus
routine brokerage transactions); the amount of information already
available about the issuer; or, the investment grade of the security?
The Commission's current interpretation of the 1933 Act-
requiring registration in many circumstances other than conventional
underwritings by professionals-is not compelled by the statute or its
legislative history. The statute seems to permit a much more relaxed
interpretation. The prevailing interpretation of the statute has changed
from time to time 69 and there is relatively little case law in this field
which would freeze the status quo and preclude a less expansive
reading of the act, especially in view of the SEC's broad rule-making
powers. 70
The definition of "underwriter" includes "any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer
in connection with, the distribution of any security . . . . 7' The
italicized words could be interpreted to exclude institutional investors
or other persons who are not generally in the business of distributing
68However, as a practical matter, the shareholder can probably obtain a staff
no-action letter if the entire bloc of stock has been held intact for a number of years,
notwithstanding the original registration.
69 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1348.
70 Cf. the Supreme Court's concession in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 125 (1953), that the Commission can use numerical tests in deciding when the
public offering exemption exists.
71 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 48 Stat 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(11) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
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securities, but who acquire securities in good faith directly from the
issuer for "investment" in the layman's sense. In the layman's sense,
an "investment" purchaser, or investor, is one who buys securities on
the open market for long-range potential rather than short-range
trading, but who considers the securities readily marketable.
I would not suggest an interpretation which makes a blanket ex-
emption for all sales to nonprofessionals in the securities business. On
the other hand, I think that the SEC has ample authority to adopt
a definitional rule relaxing the registration requirements considerably,
especially for companies making adequate disclosures under the con-
tinuous reporting system of the 1934 Act. Possibly the exemption
should be conditioned on a sufficient holding period. There could be
a presumption (possibly a conclusive presumption) that securities can
be sold freely after they have been held for one or two years.
The availability of exemptions is an integral part of the timing
problem-when the disclosure documents must be used. The Com-
mission has ample authority, almost entirely unused, to create ex-
emptions for small transactions under section 3 (b) of the 1933 Act.
72
Section 3(b) seems to contemplate meaningful exemptions from the
registration requirement for de minimis transactions, yet, I have been
informed by reliable sources that less than $20,000 of securities were
involved in roughly half of the 1933 Act no-action requests received
by the SEC in a representative period. By creative use of its statutory
power to exempt small sales, especially "secondary" sales by existing
holders, the SEC could achieve a major improvement in the disclosure
system.
With a slight relaxation of the doctrine on integrating related
transactions, a much higher effective ceiling could be achieved. For
example, Regulation A now permits sales of up to $300,000 of secu-
rities within a two-year period,73 and there is no express limitation on
the ability to use the exemption in successive periods. The waiting
period could be shortened. An exemptive rule might permit, under
appropriate circumstances, sales up to the $300,000 statutory maximum
each year, each month or even each day. Offerings to employees under
options or other employee benefit plans present another area where
formal 1933 Act registration seems to be an overly cumbersome pro-
cedure. The present Form S-8 registration process for employee
benefit plans could be superseded by any better plan which the SEC
72The principal use made by the SEC of its Securities Act of 1933 §3(b), 48
Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964), power has been the promulgation,
in effect, of a short form of registration under Regulation A. See note 39 supra.
In fact, this short form is used most often by small companies for which the so-called
"exempt" offering is usually a major rather than a de minimis transaction (although
the transaction is de minimis from the overall market point of view).
73 SEC Rule 254, 17 C.F.R. §230.254 (1964).
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can devise and promulgate under section 3(b), subject only to an
extremely high maximum participation of $300,000 per employee.74
There also may be some problems with the timing of 1934 Act
disclosure documents, but many, if not most, of these problems can be
solved easily by administrative action. The Form 8-K report is now
filed on a monthly basis, ten days after the end of the calendar month
in which the reportable event occurs. 75 Thus the report is not due
until at least ten and as many as forty-one days after the event. If
there are situations where the report should be filed more promptly,
the SEC has power to so require. Indeed there does not seem to be
any statutory reason why a report under the 1934 Act cannot be re-
quired before the event.
The 1934 Act continuous reporting system does not require a
disclosure filing about a material event unless the event takes one
of several specified forms. The Commission should consider creating
a broader requirement for reporting material events. As the law now
stands, the prospectus disclosure rules apply on essentially an all-or-none
basis. The SEC should find further means to identify classes of offer-
ings where the full-dress registration procedure is not needed. For these
cases abbreviated disclosure procedures should be adopted, by utilizing
either shorter registration techniques or conditions to exemptions.
C. Use of the Prospectus
It has been suggested above that the contents of a prospectus can
be tailored to fit particular needs. There remains to be considered
the great anomaly of the 1933 Act which relates to the use of the
prospectus. The act was designed to produce informed investment
decisions. However, the prospectus normally is not seen by the pur-
chaser until after his decision is made, and after he is psychologically
and probably legally committed to complete the purchase.7" Section
5 of the 1933 Act 77 provides, in effect, that the statutory prospectus
74 Since the rights of each employee under such a benefit plan typically run to
him individually and are not assignable, the SEC would be justified in applying the
$300,000 limit to each employee's individual participation and not to the plan as a
whole.
75 A Form 8-K report must be filed only if certain specified types of events
occur-e.g., a significant acquisition or disposition of property. SEC Form 8-K,
item 17, SEC Security Act Release No. 4991, Security Exchange Act Release No.
3497 (Jan. 28, 1954). There is a Form 8-K, item 12, for other types of material
events, but answering is optional. Apparently the Commission wanted to avoid
creating liability for failure to file a report, unless the form specifies with reasonable
certainty what events would trigger the reporting requirement. The SEC might
consider making item 12 mandatory for events covered by the issuer's own "financial"
press releases, which would tend to insure SEC quality disclosure for those events
which the issuer itself chooses to disclose publicly.
76 See Harry Heller, 22 Bus. LAw. 827.
77 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
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must accompany or precede the first written communication. Since
securities are normally sold orally, the prospectus is not required to
be sent, and usually is not mailed, until the bill (the confirmation)
for the purchase is mailed to the purchaser.
There are various techniques which can be used to advance the
time of prospectus delivery, without amending the statute. For
purposes of this discussion we can assume that the "prospectus" which
the purchaser receives will be a substantially final preliminary pros-
pectus, but it should be relatively easy to work out an underwriting
procedure which would permit distribution of a final prospectus before
the investor makes his decision. I would not advocate application
of the suggested techniques to all types of offerings. However, these
techniques would seem appropriate at least for first public offerings
and possibly for broader categories, such as offerings of companies
not subject to 1934 Act reporting.
The techniques include:
1. A stated policy of the Commission to withhold acceleration
unless the prospectus has been transmitted to the intended purchaser
so as to be received twenty-four hours in advance of the time when
he is asked for a definite commitment. The Commission has already
used this technique on an informal basis in some cases."
2. A disclosure technique requiring the prospectus to indicate
prominently the fact that the underwriters will not make available a
final prospectus or a substantially final preliminary prospectus to retail
purchasers before the purchasers are asked to commit themselves. As
a variation, the disclosure might inform purchasers whether or not the
underwriter will allow purchasers to rescind a purchase within a
defined period after receiving the prospectus. This is an accommoda-
tion which some underwriters now make on a limited basis.79 While
a given customer who was committed before receiving the prospectus
would not see the statement until it was too late for him, quite possibly
underwriters would find the disclosure sufficiently objectionable to
either provide a prospectus earlier or allow the purchaser to rescind. 0
78 SEC Special Study of Markets, pt. 1, at 548.
79SEC Special Study of Markets, pt. 1, 519 n.89; see Harry Heller, 22 Bus.
LAW. 827.
80 The question may be raised why this indirect disclosure technique should be
used rather than a positive requirement for advance delivery of a prospectus; there
might be limitations on the Commission's power to promulgate such a positive require-
ment, in light of the legislative history of 1933 Act § 5. SAFF OF ComM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FoREmi CommERcE, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., SEC REPORT ON PROPOSALS
FoR AMENDMENTS TO THE SEcuRiTIEs Act OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
Acr OF 1934, 3-13 (Comm. Print 1942) ; SEC Securities Act Release No. 3224 (June
6, 1947). On the subject of prospectus delivery, Congress has been rather specific,
as contrasted with certain subjects on which it has given the SEC a broad mandate
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At the least, a disclosure along the lines suggested will help educate
public customers to ask for prospectuses in the future.
3. This is an ideal area for industry self-regulation. The NASD
could provide, for example, that fair dealing and just and equitable
principles of trade require receipt of the prospectus by the customer
before he is committed.
4. Fraud principles also might be used to require earlier pros-
pectus delivery. The theory would run as follows: when a salesman
sells a security orally he is going to give some information. Once
he begins to tell the story, he must tell the whole story, make full
disclosure without omitting any material facts. In the nature of things,
such full disclosure cannot be made orally. For example, it would
not be feasible to convey the financial statements in this manner.
Therefore, if a salesman undertakes any oral selling efforts of a
security about which there is no available public information and
for which there is no established market, the duty of full disclosure
would require that the full prospectus be delivered before the purchaser
can be bound."' At a minimum, a fraud approach would place an
affirmative duty on the salesman to advise that there is no source
of public information, except for the prospectus which is available
on request."'
5. At the present time, there is no requirement for advance delivery
of an offering circular for an offering of less than $300,000, exempt
to shape the law administratively. A further virtue of the disclosure techniques
suggested in the text above is that it gives the underwriter a choice of courses to
follow.
The SEC has broad power to prohibit any practice which operates as a fraud
or deceit, including particularly unfair methods of dealing by broker-dealers. E.g.,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1964). If the Commission concluded that the sale of a speculative security in a
registered offering without a prior prospectus delivery is an unfair method of doing
business, it may have adequate power to prohibit such a practice.
81 Of course, this theory, if pushed to its logical conclusion, could cover any type
of oral sales activity. However, the Commission, in its expertise, could articulate a
standard to support an advance delivery requirement which would cover only a
limited number of cases, for example, cases where there is no reservoir of public
information and no &stablished market for the security.
Even if the prospectus were read in full over the telephone, the Commission
could find that the sales technique was inherently fraudulent, notwithstanding such
full disclosure. See Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards, 29
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 691, 703 (1964).
82 If it appears that "there is unusual lack of pertinent information necessary to
reach an informed judgment as to the value of the securities, this fact would be a
material fact within the meaning of the anti-fraud provisions . . .". SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4352, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6525 (April 12, 1961)
(dealing with Volkswagenwerk A.G.). Compare the position taken by the Com-
mission in another context. The Commission has indicated that brokers having
transactions in foreign securities for which there is inadequate public information
should "consider this fact in deciding Whether they have a reasonable basis for
recommending these securities to customers." SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 8066, at 3 (April 28, 1967).
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under Regulation A.' Since 1933 Act section 3(b), under which
Regulation A was promulgated, gives the SEC clear power to make
any exemptions conditional, the Commission could certainly require
advance delivery of the offering circular in a Regulation A offering. 4
The foregoing discussion concerns means of increasing the pros-
pectus delivery requirements in certain instances. On the other hand,
there are circumstances where the prospectus delivery requirements
are unduly burdensome and probably unworkable.'3 The 1933 Act
requires, in essence, delivery of a prospectus by any dealer selling a
registered security within forty days after the commencement of the
offering, including dealers unconnected with the distribution."0 The
SEC should make further use of its administrative power to reduce
these burdens.8 7
D. Elimination of Uncertainty
In reforming the disclosure system, the Commission should strive
for much greater predictability. There is far too much uncertainty
as to what the disclosure requirements are and when they apply.
Some of the rules and items in SEC forms have acquired such an ad-
ministrative gloss that even the most sophisticated practitioner reading
the text is occasionally astounded at the Commission's interpretation.8"
The difficulty is heightened by inconsistencies among the various
branches of the staff which process the filing. Needless delays, irrita-
tion, expense and embarrassment can result when a filing is deficient
due to an unexpected interpretation.
83 SEC Rules 251-63 and the related forms constitute Regulation A. 17 C.F.R.
230.251-.263 (1964). An offering circular under Regulation A is generally equivalent
to a prospectus used for a registered offering. See Rule 256, 17 C.F.R. § 230.256
(1964).
84 Indeed, the entire Regulation A procedure, including the required filings and
the use of the offering circular, are merely conditions to the availability of the
exemption.
85 Special Study of the Markets, pt. 1, 549-50; Albert Pratt, 22 Bus. LAw. 924-25.
86 Securities Act of 1933 §4(3), 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)
(1964). The period is 90 days for "first!' offerings.
87 The 1964 Amendments modified the present Section 4(3) of the 1933 Act and
granted the SEC power to shorten the period by rule, regulation or order. SEC
Rule 174, 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (1966), the only rule to shorten the period promul-
gated under this power, is of relatively limited applicability. Cf. SEC Rule 425A,
17 C. F. R. § 230.425A (1966), and SEC Securities Act Release No. 4726 (Sept. 15,
1964).
s8To cite a not atypical case, proxy statements on mergers require a notation
of the price range of listed securities on a quarterly basis over two years. SEC
Reg. 14a, Schedule A, item 15(c), 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-101 (Supp. 1966). Citing
only this provision and the full disclosure requirement of SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (1964), at least one staff member has insisted that the specific prices
must be shown on the date the merger was announced.
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The nagging uncertainty in the securities law field is especially
troublesome to lawyers because of the frequent need for legal opinions.8 9
In most business dealings, parties are willing to act without a formal
legal opinion. In the antitrust field, for example, a transaction is
rarely conditioned upon a legal opinion that it does not violate the
antitrust laws. However, transactions relating to securities very
often require legal opinions as to propriety. Securities lawyers fre-
quently find that the risk in a particular case is minimal. As a busi-
ness matter, they advise the client to proceed with the transaction.
However, there may be such uncertainty that the lawyer (especially
the more careful lawyer)," will not give the type of unqualified opinion
necessary for the transaction to close. The common use of formal
opinions no doubt explains, in part, the frequency of requests to the
SEC for no-action positions.
Because of these factors, the Commission should recognize a
special obligation to inform the public of new developments. Inter-
pretive releases and published opinions of the General Counsel can
accomplish a great deal in this respect. The Commission has made
strides in this direction, but more efforts are needed." The Commis-
sion should adopt a firm policy that no comment of general applicability
(i.e., not related to the particular situation of an individual filing)
should be permitted on an individual filing unless the comment is
approved for universal application by all branches. As soon as a new
comment is adopted, efforts should be made to advise the public.
Where it does not seem necessary to amend the form itself, guideline
releases can be published from time to time." An even less formal
89 The common use of opinions may be due in part to the frequency of inter-
mediaries between sellers and purchasers of securities-such as broker-dealers and
transfer agents-who are paid relatively little for their services but who are exposed
to serious consequences if they act improperly. These intermediaries may often
insist on unqualified legal opinions which the principals to the transaction would
forego.
90 On many subjects, even to recognize the existence of a problem takes a high
degree of sophistication and expertise. Unfortunately this leads to opinion shopping;
if the first lawyer will not give an unqualified opinion, the client will seek another
lawyer who-not recognizing the problem or being willing to take the risk--will
render the opinion desired. As a practical matter, border line transactions are very
rarely challenged, and the lawyer willing to render a doubtful opinion can feel
reasonably safe from adverse consequences.
91 See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966) (interpreting
Rule 154) ; Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4708, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7366 (July 9, 1964);
Offer and Sales of Securities by Underwriters and Dealers, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4697 (May 28, 1964) ; Broker-Dealer Participation in Proxy Solicita-
tions, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7208 (Jan. 7, 1964) ; cf. Cohen &
Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards, 29 LAw & CONTEmP. PRoa. 691,
708-10 (1964).
92 See Guides for the Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4666 (Feb. 7, 1964). This technique must be used with
some restraint, however, lest the Commission expose itself to the charge (already
leveled at it at least once, Cohen & Rabin, supra note 91, at 719 n.189) that its guide-
lines "interpretations" amount to amendments to the forms without compliance with
the Administrative Procedure Act.
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approach would be the public release of extracts from comment letters
(and no-action letters, as well), deleting, when appropriate, identifying
names and details. 3 The commercial loose-leaf services might be
willing to disseminate this type of information, possibly-as is now
done on a limited basis 4-- as annotations to the rules and disclosure
forms themselves. Similarly, the Commission has used the technique
of sending letters to the commercial services as a means of communicat-
ing a Commission position 5
E. Upgrading the 1934 Act Continuous Disclosure System
At present, the disclosure system is inefficient. The 1933 Act
produces over-disclosure on an erratic basis; the 1934 Act produces
under-disclosure on a regular basis. Registration under the 1933
Act produces a composite, useful disclosure document. However,
the document is required only upon the random occurrence of a regis-
tered offering. Many of the registration statements now being filed
relate to offerings which have insignificant impact on the market and,
furthermore, the prospectus gets little dissemination. Therefore, in
many cases the 1933 Act registration process involves effort, expense
and delay disproportionate to the public benefit.
Reporting under the 1934 Act produces filings which are gen-
erally unrelated to each other; there is no periodic synthesis of the
bits and pieces. Thus, 1934 Act disclosure has failed to achieve
its potential as a means of disseminating useful investment informa-
tion. The goal should be a continuous reporting system which, with
a minimum of effort, keeps the whole range of information reasonably
current and accessible at all times. If the 1934 Act continually pro-
duces complete current information in useable form, 1933 Act regis-
tration can be de-emphasized as the keystone of the disclosure system.
This shift in emphasis can be accomplished by use of the SEC's broad
authority to specify the form, content and timing of 1934 Act disclosure
filings.
93 Indeed, the "freedom of information" amendments to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) ; 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (Supp. 1967), effective July 4, 1967,
will force the Commission to make many types of information available to the public
-e.g., staff manuals which interpret the disclosure items and list points to be covered
in reviewing filings. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4871 (June 30, 1967).
94 The Comterce Clearing House, Federal Securities Law Reporter has a sec-
tion on "How to Answer Form S-1" which gives illustrative answers to various
disclosure items taken from actual prospectuses. 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 8001
(1967).
95 Letter from the Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance to
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Aug. 1, 1962, 1 CCH FED. Sc. L. REP. 1 2231.22
(1967).
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Most, if not all, of the information found in SEC filings falls
into one of five broad categories. The full range of information ap-
pears in the basic 1933 Act and 1934 Act registration statements.
Other filings contain various combinations of the categories of
information:
1. Information describing the business and property of an issuer
generally is disclosed adequately through official filings only in registra-
tion statements under the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act,96 although informa-
tion of this type also may appear in proxy statements dealing with
certain major transactions. While the 1934 Act reporting forms
produce occasional bits and pieces of information, significant changes
in business and property can occur without a filing being required.
Thus this type of information is not kept currently available in a
form useful to the investor. Furthermore, there is no periodic syn-
thesis of this information." An important aspect of information re-
garding the business and property of an issuer is information regard-
ing pending legal proceedings which must also be filed."'
2. Information about management and control 9 including such
items as the identification of directors, officers and major stockholders;
their stockholdings, remuneration, fringe benefits; and their transac-
tions with the issuer is fully up-dated on an annual basis through the
proxy statement. 00
3. Financial information' 01 is fully up-dated on an annual basis
through the Form 10-K report to the SEC and in less detail, through
the annual report to shareholders.'
96E.g., SEC Form S-1, items 9, 10, 17 C.F.R. §239.11 (Supp. 1966); Form 10,
items 3, 4, 17 C.F.R. § 249.10 (Supp. 1966).
97 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1357; Heller, Integration of the Dissemination of
Information Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 749, 759 (1964). The only periodic reporting
disclosure requirement covering changes in business, item 4 of Form 10-K, is inap-
plicable to proxy soliciting companies. See the instruction preceding item 4. SEC
Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. §249.310 (Supp. 1966). If this exception for proxy solicit-
ing companies ever had a justification (it was apparently premised on the judgment
that companies with listed securities disclosed this information adequately in their
shareholders reports), the justification largely disappeared when the 1964 Amend-
ments extended the proxy provisions to larger over-the-counter companies. Even
so, item 4 of Form 10-K covers only materially important changes "during the
fiscal year," and it does not purport to cover changes occurring over an extended
period of time
98 SEC Form S-1, item 12, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (Supp. 1966); Form 10, item 6,
17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (Supp. 1966) ; Form 8-K, item 3, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1964).
99 SEC Form S-1, items 16-20, 17 C.F.R. §239.11 (Supp. 1966); Form 10,
items 7, 9-13, 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (Supp. 1966).
100 SEC Reg. 14a, Schedule A, items 4-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (Supp.
1966).
101 The list of subsidiaries which appears in various SEC filings (e.g., 1933
Act Form S-1, item 27; 1934 Act Form 10, item 2; 1934 Act Form 10-K, item 3)
can be viewed as a part of the financial statement or as a separate category of
information.
102 SEC Rule 14a-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1964).
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4. Information concerning the occasion for the filing appears in
various filings. In a 1933 Act registration statement, information
of this category relates to such details of the offering as to how the
securities are to be sold, by whom, and how the proceeds will be ap-
plied.10 3  In a Form 8-K report, the information relates to the trans-
action or event triggering the filing. In a proxy statement, the infor-
mation concerns the calling of the meeting and the matters to be voted
upon.
5. Finally, a description of the securities 104 disclosing the at-
tributes of the securities and the rights of the holders must be filed in
certain proxy statements and other filings relating to the issuance of
securities105
Given these categories of information, the filing requirements can
be recast into an effective continuous reporting system under the 1934
Act. As one possible variation, a filing pattern might be built around
five basic components, which would serve to keep the full range of
information found in SEC filings reasonably current at all times.
1. A basic "identification" filing would contain information which
is unlikely to undergo frequent change, such as the issuer's exact
name, address, the form and place of organization and indemni-
fication provisions for the benefit of directors and officers.'0  It would
also include a description of the securities and the rights of security
holders. This filing would be amended only if, and when, the informa-
tion changes.
103 SEC Form S-1, items 1-4, 17 C.F.R § 239.11 (Supp. 1966).
104 SEC Form S-1, items 13-15, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (Supp. 1966); Form 10,
items 14-16, 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (Supp. 1966).
105 Disclosures of this type rarely raise serious problems---either for the company
preparing a filing or for a public investor who wants to obtain the information.
Once a description of the security has been prepared for SEC filing, there is usually
little difficulty in reproducing the description in any later filing. The basic infor-
mation is generally available to the public through manuals and services. Secu-
rities holders, as such, often have the right under state law to obtain the infor-
mation directly from the issuer, and the information may well appear on the physical
certificate itself. Although SEC filings in this area of disclosure may be particularly
weak in one respect-the extreme summarization and condensation permitted-few
problems seem to have arisen. For example, a description of a convertible security
may disclose that the conversion right is protected by an "anti-dilution" provision, with-
out telling how the provisions would apply in any given case. Or, disclosure may
be made that an indenture imposes restrictions on dividends by indicating the present
amount available for dividend payments, without giving any indication of what will
happen in future years under various contingencies. One reason such condensation
is tolerated is the inherent complexity of a typical anti-dilution or dividend restriction
formula, which may run several printed pages and simply defies meaningful explanation
without undue length (assuming it can be meaningfully explained to the typical
investor at all).
106 E.g., SEC Form S-, item 29, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (Supp. 1966); Form 10,
item 8, 17 C.F.R. § 249210 (Supp. 1966).
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2. A proxy statement for the annual meeting would restate an-
nually all of the management and control information. This is, in
essence, what the proxy statement now does and no major changes
are contemplated.
3. An annual filing (equivalent to Form 10-K) would restate
fully each year the other pertinent information found in SEC filings
(insofar as applicable). This restatement would be required even if
there is no change from the information previously filed. No in-
corporation by reference would be permitted. In effect, the annual
filing would be a complete self-contained document. This proposal
is made, however, subject to two major reservations.1
0 7
First, the annual filing probably should not repeat the manage-
ment information which appears in the proxy statement. Although
it can be argued that there is a benefit in having a single document
containing all of the current information, it should not be difficult for
investors to use two current documents-the proxy statement and
the annual filing-and issuers should be spared the burden of repetition.
Second, a major deficiency in the 1934 Act reporting system is
its failure to produce a current business and property description. This
defect should be cured. However, it may not be necessary to require
a full restatement on an annual basis. A less frequent restatement cycle
of about every two or three years might be sufficient, unless intervening
events have made the most recent filing materially out of date.' Or,
an existing precedent '0 9 might be followed requiring (or permitting
at the issuer's election) the periodic business and property restate-
ment to appear in the annual report to shareholders. Still another
variation would be to require inclusion of the business and property
description in the proxy statement. Being the only official filing dis-
tributed to the public on a regular periodic basis, the proxy statement
may well emerge as the most important of all the SEC filings.110
107 The SEC work load now peaks in the early spring with filings which follow
the issuer's year end by 3 or 4 months, such as registration statements, proxy state-
ments and Form 10-K reports. If the business and property description is to be in
an official "filing", and not a part of the annual shareholders report (an alternative
suggested in the text below), a major administrative problem might be created by
a further increase in the spring work load. This difficulty could be ameliorated by
dividing the annual report into two parts, with the non-financial part to be filed at a
different, less busy time of the year.
108 Cf. Cohen, supra note 9, at 1374-75. In certain circumstances, an annual
restatement might nonetheless be required, for example, for a stated number of years
following a first public offering or a 1933 Act, Rule 133 transaction.
109 SEC Rule 14a-3(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-3(b) (2) (Supp. 1966).
110 See 2 Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGuLATIOx 1027 (2d ed. 1961).
REFORM OF SECURITIES LAWS
However, from several points of view, the annual stockholders
report might be an even better vehicle for this type of information than
an official filing. The stockholders report gets broad public distribu-
tion, as contrasted with all 1934 Act filings other than the proxy state-
ments. Because it is a document which is distributed to the public,
the annual report is normally prepared with care."' The annual report
to shareholders is not an official "filing." 112 Thus, it would not be
subject to staff review, with the consequent administrative burden on
the Commission, although it can be expected that the SEC would, as
now, receive "information" copies on which it could make informal
comments, where appropriate for the issuer's future guidance. Nor
would it be subject, as such, to statutory liabilities for defective filings."3
It might be argued that statutory liabilities for defective filings are
necessary to insure the reliability or quality of the information. Ex-
perience shows, however, that the quality of annual shareholder reports
is generally satisfactory; the absence of the specific statutory liabilities
for false filings should present no serious problems. In any event, a
misleading annual report could still give rise to liability under general
fraud provisions," 4 and the SEC would have the power to suspend
trading in the issuer's stock or to seek injunctive relief until appropriate
corrections are brought to the attention of the public." 5
"II It has been noted that 1934 Act filings do not have the same "quality" as
1933 Act registration statements in terms of care of preparation. While differences in
liability may explain this in part, there is another factor-1934 Act reports are not
distributed publicly and do not convey a public image. By contrast, annual reports
are typically prepared with great care and attention.
112 Annual shareholder reports must be mailed to the Commission "solely for
its information" SEC Rule 14a-3(c), 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-3(c) (Supp. 1966). Cf.
SEC Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (Supp. 1966), instructions as to "Supple-
mental Information to be Furnished . . ." at the end of the official form.
113 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 48 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
78r (1964).
114 E.g., SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
115 If material voluntarily distributed to stockholders, including the annual report,
is materially deficient, the Commission has power under Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 15(c) (5), 78 Stat. 570 (1964), added by, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (5) (Supp.
1966), and § 19(a) (4), 48 Stat. 898, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (4) (1964), to suspend trad-
ing in the security, a power which it has been exercising with increasing frequency.
See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 7980 (Oct. 18, 1966); 8026
(Jan. 19, 1967) ; 8061 (April 21, 1967) ; 8065 (April 27, 1967) ; 8095 (June 1, 1967).
As to injunctive relief, see, e.g., SEC v. First Standard Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.,
1191,824 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1966) ; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8089
(May 26, 1967).
A similar value judgment on the need for statutory liability as a "filing" was
raised in connection with foreign issuers who have securities trading in the U.S.
The Commission found that the public interest would be adequately protected by
requiring foreign issuers to furnish the SEC with copies of material made available
to the public in their own countries, without subjecting such material to liabilities
for "filed" material under Section 18 of the 1934 Act. The Commission reached this
conclusion after surveying the "quality of information now being made public by
foreign issuers, together with the improvements which may reasonably be expected
to result from recent changes and current proposals for change in relevant require-
ments.. . ." See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8066, at 2-3 (April
28, 1967) (promulgating SEC Rule 12g3-2).
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Based on existing precedent, the Commission should have ample
power under the 1934 Act's proxy provision "" to require a periodic
business and property restatement either in the proxy statement or in
the annual report. Present proxy rules require financial statements
to be included in the annual report which must accompany or precede
the annual proxy solicitation for the election of directors.1 7  The
theory is that the management must account for its stewardship in
seeking to elect its nominees. By a similar line of reasoning, the
management also could be required to produce a periodic "state of
company" report describing the business and property.
The suggestion for upgrading the 1934 Act annual filing to cover
a full range of information is not revolutionary. The Form 10-K
report now updates financial information and no major substantive
change is contemplated in this respect, except that a prospectus-type
capitalization table probably should be added to the annual filing."'
The principal changes would be the periodic updating of information
on business and property (subject to the reservations stated above).
4. A current report (equivalent to Form 8-K) would serve to
keep all information up to date during the year. Instead of merely
giving bits and pieces of information, the current report would restate
in full any item in the annual filing or proxy statement which materially
changes. It would also describe the transaction or event which occa-
sions the particular current filing. Thus, if there has been a major
disposition of property, the filing would describe the circumstances
and restate the entire property item. As is now the case, no current
form would be required unless the change from previously filed informa-
tion is material.
5. The final filing requirement would be a cross-reference or "tie"
sheet which would identify by caption and number each item of informa-
tion covered by the reporting documents, and would indicate the latest
filing in which the responsive information can be found."' Each time
the issuer makes any filing which changes the previous cross-reference
sheet, a completely new sheet would be filed.
To make the system suggested above more effective, the SEC
would have to place more emphasis on the processing of filings of 1934
Act reports to upgrade their quality and reliability, as compared with
116 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 48 Stat 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
78n (1964).
117 SEC Rule 14a-3 (b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (Supp. 1966).
1
3. See SEC Form S-1, item 5, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (Supp. 1966).
119 Compare the cross reference sheet now required by SEC Rule 404(c), 17
C.F.R. § 230.404(c) (1964), for all registration statements.
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1933 Act filings. 20 There also would have to be internal changes in
the filing system to make the current information readily accessible.
12 1
The system would probably require a uniform numbering system for
the individual items of information as they recur throughout the
forms.1
22
If the 1934 Act continuous reporting system is revised as suggested
above, an important objective will be achieved. As has been previously
suggested, 1934 Act filing will be upgraded to make available to the
investor a full range of current information which may be obtained
by consulting a limited number of filings.123  The investor would know
that certain basic information, such as the description of securities,
can be found in the basic "identification" file. Reasonably current
information concerning management would be found in the most
recent proxy statement; reasonably current information on all other
subjects would be found in the most recent annual filing (subject to
the possible exception discussed above with respect to business and
property information). Any major changes in the brief period since
the last annual filing or the last annual proxy statement would be re-
flected in the current reports, if any, which would restate the applicable
items on a current basis and also would describe the transaction which
gave rise to the change.
The foregoing suggestions for rearranging the continuous report-
ing system is merely one of many possible approaches, a variation on
an underlying suggestion that 1934 Act reporting should be upgraded
administratively to provide, in effect, a continuously current prospec-
tus. 24  It is meant to illustrate the type of change in the disclosure
system which the Commission can achieve under its existing statutory
power. Regardless of whether or not this is the best possible proposal,
it is evident that the Commission's broad grants of authority under
the 1934 Act give it ample power to achieve significant improvements
in the disclosure system through administrative action.
It is not without trepidation that I offer the foregoing suggestions
for restating certain previously filed material. I share the general
120 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1362. I would agree with Mr. Cohen's observa-
tion, 22 Bus. LAw. 813, that the quality gap between 1934 Act and 1933 Act filings
seems to have narrowed in recent years.
121At present each 1933 Act filing of an issuer is maintained separately from
every other one, and also from the issuer's 1934 Act filings. In an ideal system, all
current information should be kept in one place and stale information should be
weeded out as it is superseded. It must be recognized, however, that to accomplish
this end would present a significant logistics problem.
192 This suggestion has been made before. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9,
at 1375.
123 See Harry Heller, 22 Bus. LAw. 827.
=4 See id. at 823-27.
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aversion to duplication of effort.125 However, I have concluded that
the burden of repetition is neither great nor disproportionate to the
public benefit. Based upon a review of a cross section of prospectuses, I
estimate that the non-financial, non-management material which would
have to be restated would normally take an average of only three to
six prospectus-size (7y" x 9") printed pages. In the case of a rela-
tively stable company, the job of verifying and updating the descriptive
textual material is a simple one and should not involve undue burden.
If significant revisions are necessary, the public deserves the benefit
of a composite restatement. 2 6
F. Exemptive Rules
If the 1934 Act proxy and reporting forms are revised as sug-
gested above, opportunities would be available for new exemptive rules.
A seller of securities would be able to assemble a complete package
of current information by collecting (in photocopy form from the
SEC) the latest filing covering each item of information about the
issuer. The package could be assembled under a "wrap-around" cover
setting forth the pertinent information relating to the particular offering
-such as the indentification of the seller and the plan of distribution.'
The package should also include a cross-reference sheet which locates
the information on each item. By analogy to the Regulation A proce-
dure, the material would be filed with and reviewed by the SEC.
(Alternatively, the rule might require the preparation and use of the
package, but without requiring that it be filed with the SEC.)...
Exemptions from registration could be conditioned on the use
of such a package, in much the same manner as Regulation A condi-
tions exemption on the use of an offering circular. The seller intending
to use this exemption procedure should be required to give the issuer
a period of advance notice, so that the issuer can be sure that its filings
are up to date. The seller could then assemble the filing with a mini-
mum of effort and expense. In processing the filing, the SEC presum-
ably would have to review only the wrap-around cover, since the
12 See Cohen, id. at 815. For a comparable situation where a repetition of pre-
viously filed material may be required to make an amended filing more useful, see
the forms changes proposed by SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8125
(July 18, 1967), and SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 210 (July 18, 1967).
16As a general matter, it is much simpler to update the business and property
section of an SEC filing than to update the management material, since the manage-
ment material requires assembly of a considerable amount of detail (most of which
is not unlikely to change slightly from year to year) regarding a number of different
people. Yet the updating of a routine annual meeting proxy statement has never
been considered to be a particularly burdensome chore.
127 See, e.g., SEC Form S-1, items 1-4, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (Supp. 1966).
128 In effect, this alternative approach merely imposes on the seller an obliga-
tion to supply the purchaser with certain material previously filed by the issuer.
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materials inside will be made up of filings already processed by the
staff. The reviewing process should take only a few days.
If the SEC should adopt such a procedure, a decision would have
to be made concerning the type of offering to which it would apply.
The approach seems particularly suitable to "secondary" offerings
not involving conventional underwritings, particularly those distribu-
tions which will involve relatively few sales because they represent a
small quantity of stock or a small group of buyers purchasing large
blocs.
Without attempting to suggest precise limits, the wrap-around
package technique could be applied as a conditional exemption to a class
of offerings somewhere between the type of sale which is now exempt
and conventional underwritings. The Commission should retain some
discretion as to when the technique can be used, in order to avoid
packages which are unduly complex or cumbersome.129
The suggestion of a wrap-around cover over a package of prior
filings has been made in terms of a conditional exemption. Of course,
the same type of physical document could be used as a form of regis-
tration statement for a non-exempt offering. This would seem to be
a very useful device if applied selectively where there is no real need
for a prospectus in conventional form. The typical institutional pur-
chaser, for example, is fully capable of dealing with the material in
the physical form suggested above, and the preparation of a conven-
tional prospectus for such a sophisticated investor represents a very
burdensome, expensive and time-consuming exercise. This form of
registration could be made available for offerings limited to institu-
tions (as defined) or other single purchasers of more than a stated
value of securities, for example $50,000.
The wrap-around prospectus presents complex issues of liability.
If the approach is adopted as a conditional exemption from the 1933
Act registration requirements, the issuer would remain subject to
liability for defective filings.130 As a general rule, I think it is desirable
to protect selling shareholders using this technique unless they are in a
position of control or know or have reason to know of deficiencies in
the filings which are physically incorporated. If the technique has
merit, I believe that liability questions can be solved satisfactorily,
although a fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
'
2 9 The Commission now makes this type of judgment in an analogous area. A
prospectus can be amended or supplemented by one or more stickers, but if the
"stickering" gets overly complicated, the staff will insist on a reprinted prospectus
incorporating all the changes.
130 Specific statutory liability might arise, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18,
48 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964). Liability might also arise under
Rule 10b-5. Miller v. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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G. Civil Liability
One of the most pressing and controversial subjects to consider
in any reform effort is the general topic of civil liability, especially
implied civil liability under 1934 Act Rule 10b-5. 3' To a large
extent, the law in this area has been made by the courts,'32 not the
Commission. Accordingly, the SEC may lack the broad power to
reshape the law which it has in the other areas discussed above.'33
It could, of course, take the drastic but highly unlikely step of revoking
Rule lOb-5. It might follow the example of the Comptroller of the
Currency (who administers the 1934 Act with respect to national
banks 134), and attempt to negate by rule any implied civil liabilities
arising under SEC rules.'35
To a large extent, the growing body of case law on civil liability
involves alleged wrongdoing-non-disclosure of material information
or the dissemination of misleading information-unrelated to the
registration or other filing requirements under the securities law.' 36
While the problems posed by these cases are difficult and controversial,
they are severable, to a large extent, from the other problems discussed
herein. The SEC's limited administrative powers over civil liability
questions should not deter an administrative reform program of the
type envisioned by this article.
H. The SEC as the Agency for Reform
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the Commission's
power to reform the law. A difficult question to face is whether the
Commission is an appropriate agency to spearhead a reform effort.
'3' See David S. Henkel, 22 Bus. LAW. 866.
132 E.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965) ; Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195
(5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
133 The SEC does have very broad powers under Securities Exchange Act § 16(b),
48 Stat. 896, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (Supp. 1966), to effect civil liabilities
under the "short-swing profit" recapture provisions of that section. See, e.g., SEC
Rule 16b-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1964) (reversing the principle of Park & Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947)), and
SEC Rule 12h-3, 17 C.F.R. §240.12h-3 (Supp. 1966) (reversing the principle of
Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
'34 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(i), 78 Stat. 565, added by 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(1) (Supp. 1966).
135 "The enforcement of [the Comptroller's regulations applicable to national
banks under the 1934 Act] shall be a function solely of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency and no provision of these regulations . . . is intended to confer any
private right of action on any stockholder or other person against a national bank,"
31 Fed. Reg. 6949 (1966).
336 See cases cited in note 132 supra. Of course, some of the troublesome
implied liability cases have involved SEC filings, e.g., J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Miller v.
Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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Paradoxically, there is legitimate basis to fear that it will either do
too much, or too little.
It is fashionable in some quarters to speak of power-grabbing
bureaucratic zealots who, unless restrained, would bring disaster in
an effort to advance their own view of the public good. Although
there is an inherent risk in encouraging a government agency to
rewrite the law, I share the confidence that the Commission would act
with restraint.137 While not dominated by the industry, the Commis-
sion has shown a healthy respect for industry opinion. The prevailing
spirit of self-regulation and government-industry cooperation generally
has resulted in acceptable compromises for controversial topics. The
Commission has not been anxious to override firm industry opinion
on major issues.
On the other hand, it may be feared that the Commission would
find it impossible to dismantle and restructure its own creation. 38 In
its reform efforts, it may deliver too little, too late." The Commission
may be so wedded to certain ideas-such as the mystique of "invest-
ment intent" which surrounds the 1933 Act's Section 4(2) "private
offering" exemption-that it would not abandon them.
One should bear in mind, however, that the current problems
with the disclosure system do not date back to 1933. To a large
extent the burst of public financings in the late 1950's accentuated the
difficulties and created the serious need for revision of the disclosure
system. From the late 1950's until the market break in 1962, the
Commission was so overwhelmed with filings, especially from com-
panies making their first public offerings, that it could not devote
much attention to disclosure reform efforts. Through the spring
of 1963, the Special Study occupied a major portion of the Commis-
sion's time. During 1963-64 its efforts were devoted largely to the
1964 Amendments, first in drafting the legislation and guiding it
through Congress, and later in promulgating the rules and forms
to implement the amendments. Much of the past year or two has
been devoted to investment company problems and the Mutual Fund
Report. Viewed against the history of the last several years, the
Commission's failure to reform the disclosure system hardly proves
intransigence or insensitivity to the problems involved.
13 7 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1390 & n.145.
138 Ralph H. Demmler, 22 Bus. LAW. 840, Louis Loss, id. at 797; Stephen R.
Miller, id. at 830; David S. Ruder, id. at 831.
139 For example, its proposed so-called short form registration form, S-7, see
SEC Act Release No. 4849 (Nov. 16, 1966), proved to be something of a disappoint-
ment in that it provided relatively little shortening for relatively few companies.
James C. Sargent, 22 Bus. LAW. 801; W. McNeil Kennery, id. at 913.
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Perhaps the current discussions on codification will have a catalytic
effect. The bar and various segments of the industry should make
a clear call for reform of the disclosure system. Hopefully, the Com-
mission will give high priority to this area of its responsibility in
the near future.
One way of achieving administrative reform would be to follow
the Special Study technique.140 This would involve creation of a
special task force to work on revision of the disclosure system. The
group would include members of the SEC's staff, who are almost all
career civil servants having limited experience with the securities
laws from the public side of the fence. It would also include qualified
outsiders representing various interested parties. The group would
function with a degree of independence from the staff and the Com-
missioners in developing reform steps for Commission adoption within
the existing statutory framework. This technique exploits advan-
tages of administrative reform, while eliminating many of the ob-
jections to a program manned entirely by the SEC staff.
CONCLUSION
There is a general consensus that the federal securities laws are
in need of reform. Although legislative codification of the statutes
administered by the SEC has been urged, this article suggests that
very substantial reforms could and should be accomplished admin-
istratively within the existing statutory framework both by the SEC and
the industry. As to some problem areas, administrative solutions
through promulgation of appropriate rules and forms are probably a
more suitable approach to reform than a legislative codification. Even if
administrative solutions fall short of the ideal, it would still be worth
attempting to find administrative remedies as temporary expedients,
since they can be implemented relatively quickly as compared to legisla-
tive reforms.
This article does not purport to survey all of the trouble areas
which should be considered in reforming or codifying the federal
securities laws. However, if we can find acceptable administrative
solutions to those problems discussed above, we will have made very
substantial gains a---gains which would justify amply the effort
of the undertaking.
140 This suggestion was made by Richard H. Paul, 22 Bus. LAW. 800-01, who
served as Chief Counsel to the SEC Special Study.
141 The "three problems [which] appeared clearly to be most pressing" to the
Investment Bankers Association, all of which they felt could be ameliorated admin-
istratively, were (1) the need for shorter registration forms for 1934 Act reporting
companies, (2) clarification on the sale of "investment stock," and (3) simplification
of prospectus delivery requirements. See Albert Pratt, id. at 923-25.
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A number of suggestions and examples of what could be accom-
plished administratively are set forth above. I am not so presumptuous
as to believe that all of these proposals will prove workable. In draft-
ing SEC rules and forms, it is difficult to set down two consecutive
sentences without incurring difficulties. Whether or not the reader
agrees with the specific proposals herein-and frankly I doubt whether
many readers will agree with all of them-is not the main point
of this article. Its principal purpose is to demonstrate that there are
other approaches to reform beside codification, not the least of which is
through administrative action.
The charge may be made that some of the proposals in this
article are artificial. To this charge a demurrer is entered. Many
developments in our law, both common and statutory, have this
characteristic-it is part of the genius of our system. Many a well
established doctrine has doubtful antecedents. I do not recommend
artificial growth which leads to undue complexity and uncertainty, or
arbitrary results. No doubt use of the Commission's administrative
tools has resulted, to some extent, in these undesirable consequences
in the past. One may feel, for instance, that doctrine overshadows
practical sense insofar as the SEC applies the 1933 Act to privately
placed convertible securities." However, creative use of the same
administrative tools can simplify the system, and can produce a rea-
sonably rational, workable and predictable set of rules for conduct.
If such a set of rules can be fit within the existing statutory mold,
does it matter that the fit may seem artificial? As Holmes taught
us, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."' 43
A call for reform has been issued. There are qualified experts
who feel that the SEC is not the appropriate institution to lead the
reform effort. It may be that in the long run Congressional action,
either through a codification process or through more limited legisla-
tive programs, will be needed for optimal results. I feel, however,
that the Commission has ample power to achieve substantial gains.
I hope that the Commission will accept the challenge.
142 See SEC Rule 155, 17 C.F.R. § 230.155 (1964).
1
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